Corporate Finance In Europe Confronting Theory With Practice by Brounen, D. (Dirk) et al.
  
 
 
 
C
Dirk  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ERIM REPORT SERIES RES
ERIM Report Series reference n
Publication  
Number of pages 
Email address corresponding a
URL 
Address 
 
Bibliographic data and clasCorporate Finance In Europe 
onfronting Theory With Practice 
 
Brounen, Abe de Jong and Kees Koedijk
 
 EARCH IN MANAGEMENT 
umber ERS-2004-002-F&A 
January 2004 
41 
uthor ckoedijk@fbk.eur.nl 
https://ep.eur.nl/handle/1765/1111 
Erasmus Research Institute of Management (ERIM) 
Rotterdam School of Management / Rotterdam School of 
Economics  
Erasmus Universiteit Rotterdam 
P.O. Box 1738  
3000 DR Rotterdam, The Netherlands 
Phone:  + 31 10 408 1182   
Fax: + 31 10 408 9640 
Email:  info@erim.eur.nl 
Internet:  www.erim.eur.nl 
sifications of all the ERIM reports are also available on the ERIM website:  
www.erim.eur.nl 
ERASMUS  RESEARCH  INSTITUTE  OF  MANAGEMENT 
 
REPORT SERIES 
RESEARCH IN MANAGEMENT 
 
 
 
 
BIBLIOGRAPHIC DATA AND CLASSIFICATIONS 
Abstract In this paper we present the results of an international survey among 313 CFOs on capital 
budgeting, cost of capital, capital structure, and corporate governance. We extend previous 
results of Graham and Harvey (2001) by broadening their sample internationally, by including 
corporate governance, and by applying multivariate regression analysis. We document 
interesting insights on how theoretical concepts are applied by professionals in the U.K., the 
Netherlands, Germany, and France and compare these results with the U.S. We discover 
compelling variations between large and small firms across all markets. While large firms 
frequently use present value techniques and the capital asset pricing model when assessing the 
financial feasibility of an investment opportunity, CFOs of small firms still rely on the payback 
criterion. Regarding debt policy we document more subtle disparities across firms and national 
samples. We also find substantial variation in corporate governance structures, which turn out 
to be more oriented at shareholder wealth in the Anglo-Saxon countries. Corporate finance 
practice appears to be influenced mostly by firm size, to a lesser extent by shareholder 
orientation, while national differences are weak at best. 
5001-6182 Business 
4001-4280.7 Finance Management, Business Finance, Corporation Finance 
Library of Congress 
Classification  
(LCC) HG  4001+ Financial Management 
M Business Administration and Business Economics  
G 3 Corporate Finance and Governance 
Journal of Economic 
Literature  
(JEL) G 31 Capital budgeting 
85 A Business General 
220 A Financial Management 
European Business Schools 
Library Group  
(EBSLG) 220 H Capital budgeting 
Gemeenschappelijke Onderwerpsontsluiting (GOO) 
85.00 Bedrijfskunde, Organisatiekunde: algemeen 
85.30 Financieel management, financiering 
Classification GOO 
85.30 Financieel management, financiering 
Bedrijfskunde / Bedrijfseconomie 
Financieel management, bedrijfsfinanciering, besliskunde 
Keywords GOO 
Financieel management, Bedrijfsgrootte, Corparate Governance,  Vergelijkende economie, 
Europa 
Free keywords International economics, financial economics, law and economics, corporate governance, cost 
of capital, capital structure 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CORPORATE FINANCE IN EUROPE 
CONFRONTING THEORY WITH PRACTICE 
 
 
 
 
 
Dirk Brounen 
Rotterdam School of Management 
Erasmus University Rotterdam 
 
Abe de Jong 
Rotterdam School of Management 
Erasmus University Rotterdam 
  
Kees Koedijk 
Rotterdam School of Management 
Erasmus University Rotterdam 
CEPR 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Current Draft: January 2004 
 
 
 
Keywords: international economics, financial economics, law and economics, corporate 
governance, cost of capital, capital structure 
 
JEL Classification Numbers: G31, G32 
 
Correspondence to: Kees Koedijk, Erasmus University Rotterdam, Department of Financial Management, 
P.O. Box 1738, 3000 DR, Rotterdam, The Netherlands, ckoedijk@fbk.eur.nl.  
Supplementary research results are available at http://web.eur.nl/fbk/dep/dep5/research 
The authors would like to thank Mark Flood and Campbell Harvey for their helpful comments on a 
previous version of this paper and we thank the Vereniging Trustfonds Erasmus Universiteit Rotterdam for 
their financial support. All remaining errors are the responsibility of the authors. 
 1
                              
 
 
 
 
CORPORATE FINANCE IN EUROPE 
CONFRONTING THEORY WITH PRACTICE 
 
                           
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
In this paper we present the results of an international survey among 313 CFOs on 
capital budgeting, cost of capital, capital structure, and corporate governance. We 
extend previous results of Graham and Harvey (2001) by broadening their sample 
internationally, by including corporate governance, and by applying multivariate 
regression analysis. We document interesting insights on how theoretical concepts 
are applied by professionals in the U.K., the Netherlands, Germany, and France and 
compare these results with the U.S. We discover compelling variations between large 
and small firms across all markets. While large firms frequently use present value 
techniques and the capital asset pricing model when assessing the financial feasibility 
of an investment opportunity, CFOs of small firms still rely on the payback criterion.  
Regarding debt policy we document more subtle disparities across firms and national 
samples. We also find substantial variation in corporate governance structures, which 
turn out to be more oriented at shareholder wealth in the Anglo-Saxon countries. 
Corporate finance practice appears to be influenced mostly by firm size, to a lesser 
extent by shareholder orientation, while national differences are weak at best.  
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1. Introduction  
 
Over the last century academics from around the globe have worked on postulating 
models and theories enabling firms to enhance the efficiency of their financial management 
operations. Nobel price winning concepts like the capital asset pricing model and capital 
structure theorems have been praised and taught in class rooms, but to what extent these 
celebrated notions have also found their way into corporate board rooms remains somewhat 
opaque. In this paper we attempt to narrow the gap between scientists and professionals by 
conducting a survey on how professionals deal with different dilemmas within modern 
financial management. We measure the extent to which theoretical concepts have been 
adopted by professionals from a wide range of firms from the U.K., the Netherlands, 
Germany, and France. We also compare our results with the previous findings of Graham 
and Harvey (2001) for a similar sample of U.S. firms.  
Our study focuses on non-U.S. companies, offering a rare possibility to test whether 
previous results of Graham and Harvey (2001) also hold outside the United States. Recent 
studies have documented fundamental differences between the financial markets and systems 
when comparing the United States with Europe. La Porta et al (1997, 1998) focus on the 
underlying disparities between the legal systems encompassing both continents. Their results 
show how common law and civil law countries diverge with respect to protecting investors 
and thereby causing significant distinctions between both financial markets. Rajan and 
Zingales (2003) stress the continental differences by comparing the polar forms of financial 
systems: the institution-heavy relationship-based, more prevalent in Europe, and the market-
intensive arm’s-length, more prevalent in the United States. Although the European market 
appears to be switching to the arms’-length system, compelling variations between both 
continental financing policies remain. Finally, from a corporate governance perspective, Chew 
(1997) shows how the Anglo-Saxon marked-based corporate governance system significantly 
differs from the relation-based or insider system, which is most widespread in Europe. In this 
study we also investigate the effect of the corporate governance system on an individual firm 
level and include this important issue in our overall analysis of European corporate finance 
practices. The recent stream of literature tends to infer a similar conclusion; the U.S. and the 
European financial markets and firms differ considerably. We contribute to the debate by 
comparing the corporate finance practice of individual firms in both continental markets. We 
test whether the apparent differences in institutional settings translate into significantly 
different financial management practices.  
In order to confront theory with the behaviour of financial managers in practice we apply 
survey research. We analyse a wide range of corporate finance issues, ranging from capital 
budgeting techniques to capital structure, and corporate governance, which allows us to link 
the different issues and thereby deepen our analysis. Furthermore, we analyze the responses 
in our survey conditional on firm specific characteristics. This enables us to test whether these 
factors drive the results. We sample a cross-section of 6,500 companies from the U.K., the 
Netherlands, France, and Germany. We collected 313 responses creating a sample size, which 
represents the second largest survey sample in the financial literature.1 Survey research is 
                                                 
1 The Graham and Harvey (2001) study analyses a sample of 392 U.S. CFOs, the second largest published survey 
by our knowledge was by Moore and Reichert (1983) containing data on 298 large firms from the U.S. Bancel 
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relatively rare within the empirical corporate finance literature, where most studies are based 
on large samples of financial observations. Although these large samples offer cross-sectional 
variations and the statistical power to analyze these variations, they are hampered with respect 
to the specification and are limited to dealing with quantifiable issues. In our survey approach 
we use a relatively large sample combined with the ability to ask qualitative questions. Besides 
these opportunities, survey research is associated with some limitations. We measure beliefs 
rather than actions and therefore we might be confronted with respondence biases. We 
carefully take this drawback into consideration when composing our samples and 
constructing our questionnaire, such that this bias will be limited to the minimum. Although 
this type of field studies is rare, some path-breaking studies have preceded our endeavour.2 
However, the vast majority of the available financial field studies focuses on large U.S. firms 
and often is concerned with just one specific corporate finance issue at a time.  
Our study enriches the findings of Graham and Harvey (2001) in three manners. Firstly, 
by employing an international sample we are able to assess whether existing insights also hold 
outside the U.S. Secondly, we incorporate questions which address the corporate governance 
policy of firms. This enables us to investigate whether cross-national differences in corporate 
governance policies influence the way in which firms organize their financial management. 
Finally, we extend the existing literature by applying multivariate regression analysis in order 
to explain the cross-sectional variation in corporate finance practices. The multivariate 
regressions offer a better explanation of the responses than uni-variate comparisons, because 
we can measure the effect of a variable conditional on the influence of others. This approach 
enables us to test whether country effects or firm characteristics dominate the explanation of 
corporate financial management policies.   
Our results with respect to capital budgeting show that European firms are still remarkably 
keen on applying the payback criterion, instead of discounting their cash flows using the 
internal rate of return or the net present value. Alike their U.S. colleagues, European CFOs 
determine their cost of capital using the CAPM, rather than applying arithmetic average 
historic returns or the dividend discount model. Overall we notice that firm size is positively 
related to the use of discounted cash flow methodology, the application of CAPM and 
maintaining a target debt ratio. Smaller firms, and firms oriented less towards maximizing 
shareholder value are more likely to evaluate their investment opportunities using the payback 
period criterion and set their cost of capital on whatever their investors tell them. Finally, 
concerning the capital structure we find low disparities between corporate debt policies. In all 
four national samples respondents report financial flexibility to be the key factor when 
determining their debt structure, a result which corroborate with previous studies from the 
U.S. Our main results indicate that corporate financial management practices are 
predominantly determined by firm size, to a lesser extent by shareholder orientation, and 
much less by country of origin.  
                                                                                                                                                   
and Mittoo (2003) survey CFOs from 87 companies, originating from 16 different European countries, on their 
corporate debt policy, which represents the largest European survey study so far. A recent survey by Brav et al. 
(2003) on payout policy in the U.S. includes 384 respondents. 
2 The most famous survey study in the recent financial literature is by Graham and Harvey (2001), a paper, which 
was awarded the Jensen Price for the best paper published in the Journal of Financial Economics in 2001. Other 
seminal survey papers in the field of corporate finance are Lintner (1956) and Billingsley and Smith (1996). 
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The paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we present the sample collection 
procedures and sample statistics. Section three offers a comprehensive overview of our results 
on capital budgeting. Section four deals with the common practice regarding the cost of 
capital, while section five focuses on our results on capital structure. Finally we offer 
concluding remarks in section six. 
 
2. Data and methodology  
 
2.1. Sample collection procedures 
Our survey includes four groups of questions. First, we include several questions to 
describe the firm and its CEO. Second pose questions on capital budgeting techniques. Third, 
we investigate cost of capital estimations and continue our analysis by focusing on capital 
structure policy. Finally, we conclude our questionnaire by asking firms about their goals and 
their perception of the importance of different stakeholders. The starting point for our 
questionnaire is the survey of Graham and Harvey (2001). In order to facilitate a fair 
comparison of both sets of survey results, we ask exactly the same questions. In addition we 
add questions on the firm’s goals and stakeholders. 
We first prepared the survey to be send to firms in the U.K., the Netherlands, Germany 
and France. First, the survey of Graham and Harvey (2001) has been translated into German 
and French by a certified translation agency and into Dutch by the authors. Next, in order to 
test whether the translations were correct and whether the wording was understood, we 
conducted several interviews in each of the four countries. In these interviews potential 
respondents first filled in the questionnaire, and discussed each question afterwards. We 
learned that the average time to fill out the questionnaire was about 15 minutes. We adjusted 
some of the wording and added brief explanations, based on the interviewees’ feedback. Since 
we shared the concern of Graham and Harvey in that respondents might fill in only the first 
two pages of the questionnaire, we controlled for this potential bias by sending out two 
versions in each language with questions 11-14 and 1-4 interchanged. We expect this to result 
in a fair distribution of answers on each question in the survey.  
We use the Amadeus dataset of Bureau Van Dijk as our sample universe, which covers 
public and private firms in Europe. From this database we selected all firms with 25 or more 
employees. In addition we use the Kompass database with names and positions of the high-
ranked officials. We search for the name of the CFO in the Kompass data for each firm in 
the Amadeus data. Our goal is to select 2000 firms in the U.K., Germany and France, and 500 
firms in the Netherlands. We first select all public firms in each country. Then we select all 
private firms of which we know the name of the CFO. Finally, we complement our sample 
sets with randomly chosen private firms.  
The questionnaire was set out by a third party, ensuring that the results are handled 
anonymously, thereby stimulating the respondents to answer our questions frankly. In the 
period of November 1 to 8, 2002 the questionnaires were sent by mail to the sample firms. 
Each firm received a cover letter, the four-page questionnaire, a pre-stamped envelop and a 
response form to request a free report of the results. The latter serves as an incentive to fill in 
the questionnaire. The respondents were offered the opportunity to return their form both by 
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mail or by fax. About two weeks after the firms have received the questionnaire all non-
respondents were contacted by phone by native speakers, reminding them to return the 
questionnaire. During the phoneconversation the respondents could go through the questions 
over the phone immediately or receive a link to a web page for filling in the questionnaire by 
email. This telephonic and email effort lasted until January 7, 2003 and we received our last 
response on January 30, 2003.  
In total, we received 313 responses, 68 in the U.K., 52 in the Netherlands, 132 in Germany 
and 61 in France. We received 50.5% of the questionnaires by mail or fax, 19.2% by 
telephonic interviews and 30.3% through the web page. We analysed our results with regard 
to potential response biases, which threat survey research. Overall we find that our sample is 
representative of the overall universe of firms and we detect only a small variation in answers 
based on the response technique.3 The overall response rate is 5%, which is somewhat lower 
than studies like Trahan and Gitman (1995) and Graham and Harvey (2001), which obtained 
a 12% and 9% response rate respectively. However, given the length and depth of our 
questionnaire and the vast size of our sample we feel confident when analysing our results.  
 
2.2. Corporate governance characteristics 
La Porta et al. (1998) describe institutional details for 49 different countries, including the 
five countries, which are part of our study. Their results clearly show that external capital is 
most important in the U.S., U.K. and the Netherlands. The importance of the capital markets 
in the U.S. and U.K. is further stressed by the large number of listed firms and IPOs per 
million inhabitants. Furthermore, La Porta et al. (1998) report cross-national statistics on the 
power of shareholders and creditors, using a anti-director index. This anti-director index 
measures the power of shareholders, which is much higher in the Anglo-Saxon countries. 
Finally, creditor rights also differ substantially across countries in our sample and illustrate the 
large variation in institutional settings. 
In order to incorporate these fundamental differences in national market characteristics 
properly, we included questions on corporate governance, i.e. important stakeholders and 
company goals. By doing so we test whether the individual firms in our sample reflect the 
institutional variations presented in La Porta et al. (1998) and we can control for these 
variations in our further analysis. First we ask our respondents which goals their companies 
aim to achieve. Panel A of Figure 1 clearly shows that in all countries firms aim at maximizing 
their profits, sustainable growth, and market position, while solvability and dividends are 
associated with lower priorities. The most prominent distinction is reported with respect to 
the goal of maximizing shareholder wealth. While Dutch and British firms declare to consider 
shareholder wealth as one of their top priorities, French and German firms consider this goal 
even less important than optimising their solvability. In order to extend our analysis on this 
                                                 
3 We performed several experiments in order find out whether our results are affected by nonresponse bias. First 
we clustered our results along the way in which the responses have been received (mail or fax, telephone and 
internet) and analysed both the average responses and the distributions within each cluster. On a 5% significance 
level we reported a significant difference in means across clusters for only 19 out of the 133 questions and 
statements, which are included in our survey. Furthermore we follow the example of Moore and Reichert (1983) 
by comparing characteristics like firm size, industrial distribution, and public status of the responding firms to 
the population at large. Again we find no statistically significant differences between the two groups on a 5% 
confidence level and therefore we may consider our sample to be representing the population.  
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phenomenon we asked an additional question regarding stakeholder importance. The 
outcomes, which are presented in Panel B, exhibit the typical pattern in which customers are 
regarded most important in each country. Regarding shareholder and debtholder importance 
the results are more scattered and clearly show that firms in the U.K. and the Netherlands 
consider their supplier of capital to be much more important than their colleagues from 
France and Germany. French and German firms consider the general public to be more 
important to them than their financiers.   
 
2.3. Firm statistics 
Figure 2 presents summary information on the characteristics of the firms in our European 
samples and compares these with the U.S. firms of Graham and Harvey (2001).  The 
companies in our European sample are smaller on average compared to the U.S. firms of 
Graham and Harvey. While 51% of all firms in their U.S. sample have sales exceeding 500 
million U.S. dollars, this number is less than 25% in each European sample. In the 
subsequent analysis we refer to firms with sales exceeding 1 billion U.S. dollars as ‘large 
firms’. Regarding the portion of foreign sales we observe the opposite disparity. This 
component exceeds a quarter of total sales for at least 40% of each European sample, while 
U.S. firms exhibited remarkably lower involvement in foreign sales. The distribution across 
industry types is rather similar in all countries with most firms belonging to manufacturing in 
each sample. Like Graham and Harvey we document that non-manufacturing firms are 
spread evenly across other industries in our European samples. With respect to the price-
earnings ratios we document slighter lower average values for our European sample. Whereas 
only 40% of the U.S. firms reported a price-earnings ratio below 15, our European firms 
reported this response more frequently ranging between 56% in France to 67% in Germany. 
This result, however, needs to be handled with care given the time difference between both 
surveys.  
Panels E to G of Figure 2 display information concerning corporate debt policy. The 
longterm debt ratios show that about a quarter of the firms in the U.K. and France posses no 
long-term debt at all. These firms are financed completely with equity and short-term 
liabilities. The German firms are over-represented in the 10-19% interval, while many Dutch 
firms are in the 20-29% interval. Subsequently, we define low levered firms as firms with 
leverage below 30%, while highly levered firms have a debt ratio above 30%. The fractions of 
firms with low and high leverage are hardly different between the countries. The only 
exception is France, which is under-represented in the highest interval. This international 
pattern in leverage complies with previous studies of Rajan and Zingales (1995) and De 
Bondt (1998), who documented similar national differences and explained them by 
emphasizing the institutional differences and the importance of indirect credit markets. 
Regarding the presence of a target debt ratio, Panel F shows lower values for our European 
samples compared to previous U.S. results. 65% of the firms in the French sample report to 
have no debt target. We have split up our samples along target ratios and refer to firms, which 
declared to have flexible, strict or tight target ratio, as ‘target ratio’ in the subsequent analysis. 
The percentage of firms that considered issuing equity differs substantially between the three 
countries with relatively better developed public capital markets (U.S., U.K. and Netherlands) 
and the other countries. The percentage of firms that considered issuing debt is quite similar. 
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The only exception is the low percentage of German firms considering a convertible debt 
issue.  
The next component of our summary statistics concerns the CEOs background. On 
average, our results indicate that European CEOs in our sample are slightly younger than 
their U.S. colleagues. Regarding their tenure the variation is less compelling. The most 
remarkable result regarding tenure stems from France, where CEOs appear to stay with their 
firms for significantly longer time periods than their colleagues from other markets. 
Concerning the level of education of the surveyed CEOs our results show comparable 
patterns. Compared to their U.S. colleagues a smaller portion of our European CEOs quit 
their studies after their undergraduate, and slightly higher portion has acquired an MBA 
masters, except for the U.K where MBAs are rare. Finally, when it comes to executive stock 
ownership our results show very little evidence for cross-national patterns. In each sample the 
vast majority of firms responded that their executives own less than 5% of the firms’ shares.  
Finally, we gathered some summary statistics regarding the public or private status of the 
company, the dividend policy, and credit rating, of which the key results are presented in 
Panel A of Table 1. Like the U.S. firms in Graham and Harvey’s study, most of our European 
firms are not utilities, pay dividends, and have an investment grade rating. The most 
remarkable difference is that contrary to the U.S. firms our European firms are mostly 
private, although the difference in distribution is still relatively small.     
 
3. Capital budgeting techniques  
 
3.1. Design 
This section examines the way in which European firms evaluate investment projects. We 
carefully consider the underlying firm characteristics in order to link the results to differences 
in, for example, firm size and CEO education. In line with Graham and Harvey (2001) we 
include a wide variety of capital budgeting techniques, including discounted cash flow 
techniques like; the IRR, the NPV, the adjusted present value (see Brealey and Myers, 2003), 
the discounted payback period, the profitability index, and hurdle rates next to simple price 
earning multiples, book rates of return and more advanced methods like sensitivity analysis, 
real options and value at risk. Respondents are asked to score how frequently they use the 
different capital budgeting techniques on a scale of 0 to 4 (0 meaning never, 4 meaning 
always) and we display the main results in Table 2. 
 
3.2. Results 
Most European respondents select payback period as their most frequently used capital 
budgeting technique. In the U.K., the Netherlands, Germany and France respectively 69.2%, 
64.7%, 50.0% and 50.9% of CFOs use the payback period as their favourite tool. Of the U.S. 
firms of Graham and Harvey 56.7% declared to be using this payback rule, but there it came 
in only as third most popular tool after the internal rate of return and the net present value. In 
Europe the payback period criterion is immediately followed by the net present value and 
internal rate of return methods. In the U.K., the Netherlands, Germany and France 
respectively 53.1%, 56.0 %, 42.2% and 44.1% of all CFOs use the internal rate of return 
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method while 47.0%, 70.0% 47.6% and 35.1% of all CFOs in these countries rely on the net 
present value method.  
 The relative popularity of the payback period in Europe is surprising, because financial 
textbooks have discussed the shortcomings of the payback criterion for many decades. As is 
well known the payback ignores the time value of money and cash flows beyond the cut-off 
date. It is sometimes argued that the payback approach is rational for severely capital 
constrained firms: if an investment project does not pay positive cash flows early on, the 
firms will cease the operation and therefore can not receive positive cash flows that occur in 
the distant future. We do not find any evidence to support this claim. When taking firm 
characteristics into account we notice that the use of the payback criterion is more popular 
among smaller firms (except for the U.K.) and among firms with management belonging to 
the highest age cluster. The NPV is used significantly more often by large firms and by firms, 
managed by a CEO with an MBA (except for the U.K.). Here we also might find an 
explanation for the difference between our European results and the U.S. outcomes of 
Graham and Harvey, since we already noted that our European firms tend to be somewhat 
smaller on average. When accounting for cross-sectional variation in shareholder orientation, 
we find that firms that reported to maximize shareholder value are also the firms that prefer 
to use discounting techniques instead of the plain payback criterion.4 Theory shows that this 
indeed enhances shareholder wealth. 
 
4. Cost of capital  
 
4.1. Results 
The first question we asked regarding cost of capital is whether firms compute this cost 
explicitly. The response to this question exhibits a very limited cross-national variation, i.e. 
64% in the U.S., 57% in the U.K., 60% in the Netherlands, 59% in France, and 53% in 
Germany.  
We continue our analysis by focusing on the firms, which responded positively, by first 
asking them how they compute their cost of capital. We explore whether firms use the capital 
asset pricing model (CAPM), a multi-beta CAPM (with extra risk factors in addition to the 
market beta), average historical returns, a dividend discount model, or whether they simply 
apply the average historic return on common stocks or whatever their investors tell them they 
require. The results in Table 3 indicate that the CAPM is the most popular method of 
estimating the cost of equity capital in Europe: in the U.K., Netherlands, Germany and 
France, 47.1%, 55.6%, 34%, and 45.2% of CFOs relies on the CAPM for estimating the cost 
of equity. Although the CAPM is a popular method in Europe, our results also show that this 
popularity is low compared to the U.S. Graham and Harvey (2001) report that almost 73.5% 
of U.S. CFOs relies to some extent on the CAPM when estimating the cost of equity capital. 
In Europe, this percentage is considerably lower and equals around 45% on average. In line 
with the U.S. results, the second and third popular methods for the European countries are 
respectively the use of average historical returns and the use of some version of a multi-beta 
                                                 
4 We analyse sample splits based on several firm characteristics. In Tables 2 and 5 we present the results for size 
and CEO education, all remaining split ups are displayed on our website.  
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CAPM. Again the percentages for the European countries are substantially lower. The 
differences between the U.S. results and the Netherlands, German and French results are 
especially remarkable. A sound explanation for this discrepancy might be the public or private 
status of a firm. In our cross-sectional analysis we find that in each national sample public 
firms are more likely to use the CAPM for deriving their cost of capital while private firms 
use whatever their investors tell them. This difference is rational, since public firms have 
stock prices at their disposal, which they will need to run the CAPM properly. Due to the 
absence of public stock returns, private firms prefer to use whatever investors tell them when 
discounting their cash flows. In the Netherlands, Germany and France the percentages for 
this category vary between 44.8%, 39.2% and 34.4%. In the Netherlands and France this 
method is the second most popular after the CAPM. In Germany this category is even the 
most popular method and outperforms the CAPM as method for obtaining an estimate for 
the cost of capital. Remarkably enough, we do not find a consistent relationship between 
shareholder orientation and the computation of the cost of equity. Although shareholder 
oriented firms appear to be using “whatever our investors tell us they require” more often in 
most cases, the differences in results is insignificant and lacks robustness. 
When considering the underlying firm characteristics we notice that CAPM is consistently 
more popular among large firms, and among firms with relatively high proportions of foreign 
sales. The same holds for the more advanced CAPM alternatives in which additional risk 
factors are included, this too is used mostly by large companies and by firms with relatively 
high leverage. This indicates that large, public firms are more inclined to apply more 
sophisticated techniques when setting their cost of capital, whereas small firms rely on rules 
of thumb. This difference, however, is not a result of a lack of familiarity with the theoretical 
concepts, since there appears to be no relationship between the age and education of the 
CEO and the use of theoretical tools like the CAPM. If any, the relationship between the use 
of CAPM, the firm and the CEO exists, it would be reversed, since CEOs with long tenures 
are using CAPM more frequently. Apparently CEOs learn to appreciate the use of CAPM 
while they are in charge of the company, which implies that CAPM requires a critical mass 
(size), a public listing and an experienced CEO.  
  
4.2. Specific risk factors 
After acknowledging the basic concepts that are being applied when deriving the overall 
cost of equity capital, we now turn to the explicit analysis of individual projects. We identify a 
wide variety of specific risk factors, which might be of importance when evaluating an 
individual project. These factors include: interest rate risk, foreign exchange risk, business 
cycle risk, unexpected inflation, commodity price risk, term structure risk, and distress risk. In 
line with the work of Fama and French (1992) and Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) we also 
include the fundamental factors size, value, and momentum.  
We ask our respondents whether they take these individual factors into account when 
valuing projects, and if so whether they do this by adjusting their discount rate, the cash flow 
estimations or both. We display our key results in Table 4.  
Overall, we document a strong tendency for omitting most of the specific risk factors. 
This result complies with the average response of U.S. companies to the same issue. The vast 
majority of firms does not take specific risk factors into account when evaluating individual 
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investment projects. If any, firms tend to consider interest rate-, and currency risk and in 
most of those cases where they do acknowledge these risks, they absorb them by adjusting 
either the discount rates or the cash flows. Momentum is considered only by a small minority, 
except for France where 27.8% of our respondents claims to adjust their discount rate based 
on recent stock price performance. Furthermore we notice that 26.3% of German companies 
and a remarkable 46.6% of French companies is prone to amend cash flow estimations 
according to their perception of commodity price risk.       
 
4.3. Project versus firm risk 
Next we concentrate on the use of discount rates when considering new projects in 
overseas markets. The U.S. results of Graham and Harvey regarding the use of discount rates 
have been surprising. The majority of firms in their sample claimed to use the plain vanilla 
firm discount rate when evaluating new foreign projects. This outcome implies that most 
companies are not incorporating differences in project risks and foreign markets properly. By 
posing the same questions to our respondents we would like to find out whether the same 
management approach is prevailing in Europe.  
The main results of this exercise are presented in Table 5 and show even more striking 
responses.  While in the U.S. 58.8% of all firms indicated to use the discount rate of the entire 
company opposed to 50.9%, which incorporate project particularities by deriving a risk-
matched rate, this difference between these two alternatives is remarkably larger in our 
European samples. 41.0% of U.K. firms, 64.6% of Dutch firms, 42.0% of German firms and 
24.1% of French firms apply company rates, while as little as 23.7% of U.K. firms, 27.1% of 
Dutch firms, 25.0% of German firms and 27.3% make use of a risk-matched project rate of 
return. Alike the U.S. the remaining three alternatives, the use of a discount rate for the 
overseas market, a divisional discount rate, or a different rate for each component cashflow 
that has a different risk characteristic, is almost never used in each European sample. 
Large firms are more likely to apply these theoretically more sound risk-matched rates. 
Except for the Netherlands we also find that the CEOs’ education tends to increase the 
likelihood of the usage of risk-matched projects rates. Contrary to Graham and Harvey our 
results show that the more complicated alternatives of discounting new projects are applied 
more by higher educated CEOs consistently throughout all our national samples. Regarding 
the age of the CEOs in charge we notice that the simple company-wide discount rate is being 
applied mostly by the oldest CEOs, while the more complicated project specific rates tend to 
be used more often by younger CEOs. A similar variation is found when looking into the 
shareholder orientation of the firms involved. Firms that declare to maximize their 
shareholders’ wealth, tend to use more complicated firm specific rates. Since we pose the 
questions regarding new projects in overseas markets we also explicitly take foreign sales into 
account when interpreting the responses. In line with the results of Graham and Harvey we 
find no evidence that firms with foreign sales make use of more sophisticated discounting 
schemes. These international operating firms tend to rely on company discount rates in most 
cases as well.  
In summary, our results show an interesting variation in cost of capital practices. In line 
with Graham and Harvey we document CAPM to be the most popular tool when computing 
the cost of capital among the firms, which discount their cash flow estimates. However, this 
 11
result varies along firm size and appears to depend on whether firms are publicly listed. Large, 
publicly listed firms apply the CAPM on their stock price history, while small, private firms 
tend to rely on whatever their investors tell them. Furthermore, our results show that the vast 
majority of firms is likely to use a company cost of capital for evaluating their individual 
projects, instead of incorporating specific risk factors explicitly. Again we find that this 
tendency to use company discount rate differs along the size dimension, in which large firms 
are more likely to risk-matched discount rates when evaluating new projects.  
 
4.4. Multivariate regression analysis  
In order to deepen our analysis we run a set of multivariate probit regressions in which we 
can compare the impact of various explanatory variables on the four most important capital 
budgeting issues. This way we try to discover which factors determine whether firms apply 
DCF-techniques, which type of firms compute the cost of capital and which use CAPM to do 
so and which type of firms employ sophisticated discount rates? These questions are 
answered using three sets of model specifications. In the first model we analyze the 
significance of national variations of our full sample including the U.S. observations of 
Graham and Harvey (2001) through the use of a set of country dummies, in which the 
Netherlands serves as omitted variable. In the second model we extend this country analysis 
by controlling for the cross sectional variation in firm size and the educational level of the 
CEO using dichotomous variables. In our third and last model we extend the second model 
by including the level of shareholder orientation of each firm, a variable that is only available 
for our European sample. We disseminate output of additional model specifications on our 
weblink. 
First, we analyze the use of capital budgeting techniques, our results are displayed in Table 
6. We distinguish between the DCF-techniques NPV, IRR, APV, and the discounted payback 
period (dummy has value 1 if the response to at least one of these four techniques exceeds 2, 
and zero otherwise) opposed to the non-DCF-techniques. Model 1 shows that the country 
dummies reveal significant national differences. German and French firms make little use of 
DCF-techniques, while U.S. firms employ these methods significantly more often than the 
omitted Dutch firms. When including the control variables, size and CEO education, we find 
that size significantly attributes to explaining the cross sectional variation. Model 3, which 
exclusively focuses on our European sample, shows stability of the coefficient estimates 
across continents and reveal, that shareholder orientation is significantly and positively related 
to the use of DCF-methods. This conclusion confirms our results of Section 3 that large firms 
and firms, which have a strong shareholder orientation are more likely to use DCF capital 
budgeting techniques. In our second set of models we explain which firms compute their cost 
of capital. The cross-national analysis does not yield any pervasive results. Apparently 
computing the cost of capital is not induced by nationality. Firm size and shareholder-
orientation on the other hand tend to increase the likelihood of cost of capital calculations 
significantly. Among the firms, which compute their cost of capital we differentiate between 
those who apply CAPM (or an extended CAPM) to do so and the group that uses other 
technology. We find that German firms use CAPM significantly less on a 10% confidence 
level, whereas U.S. firms turn out to be the most frequent users of CAPM. Much of this 
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cross-national variation disappears when extending our model 1 with control variables, which 
show that only firm size appears to be driving the use of CAPM significantly. With respect to 
the last issue, which discount rate is used when evaluating new projects in overseas markets, 
we split up our samples into a group that utilizes a sophisticated rate in which risk-matching 
(on project, division or component level) is applied and a group that simply utilizes a 
company or country wide discount rate. The results from our first model specification show 
that U.S. firms are more likely to use a risk-matched discount rate compared to their 
European competitors. This difference, however, reduces after including the variation in firm 
size and CEO education. In combination with our results from model 3 we may conclude 
that larger and shareholder oriented firms are significantly more likely to apply a risk-matched 
discount rate.  
Overall, our results stress the importance of multivariate regressions, because this 
approach enables us to isolate the impact of variables conditional on other influences. 
Continental and cross national variations appear to be present but lose much of their impact 
when controlling for the underlying variation in firm size, CEO education, and shareholder 
orientation. Capital budgeting and cost of capital dilemmas are influenced most by firm size 
and the degree of shareholder orientation, both have a significantly positive impact on the 
issue we raise. Adding these variables significantly helps to increase the fit of the models. 
 
5. Capital structure  
 
Our firm statistics already indicated that the overall debt levels in our European samples 
were low compared to their U.S. competitors. We also showed that in our French sample 
65% of our respondents claimed to have no target debt-ratio of any kind. The combination of 
both results might indicate that capital structure is considered to be somewhat less important 
than in corporate America. In this section we analyse the capital structure of our European 
firms by posing questions with which different capital structure theorems can be tested. First 
we concentrate on the costs and benefits of debt ratios and the trade-off theory, which 
balances both. Then we continue our analysis by focusing on asymmetric information 
motives and agency costs as potential drivers of corporate debt policy.5 Table 7 describes the 
factors that determine the appropriate amount of debt in firms. The combination of testing 
for all these factors should yield us a better understanding of how European firms set their 
capital structure in practice.  
 
5.1. Trade-off theory of capital structure choice 
5.1.1. Target debt ratios and the costs and benefits of debt 
The static trade-off theory predicts a trade-off between tax advantages and bankruptcy 
costs of debt. According to this theory firms balance the beneficial tax shields with the 
                                                 
5 We analyse sample splits based on several firm characteristics. In Tables 7, 8, and 9 we present the results for 
leverage and a target debt ratio, while all remaining split ups are displayed on our website. Figure 2, panel G 
presents the percentages of firms that seriously considered issuing common stock, convertible debt, and foreign 
debt. We inquired about the underlying motivations among firms that indicated to consider the issuance. 
However, the sample sizes are relatively small and we present the results on our website. A discussion of 
additional results regarding product markets, industry factors, control contests, risk management and cash 
management considerations is presented on our website.   
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financial distress costs when determining the appropriate amount of corporate debt. We test 
this theory by inquiring about the importance of both factors and document that tax 
advantages of interest deductibility are considered to be only the fourth most important factor 
in this context, after financial flexibility, credit ratings and earnings volatility. The cross-
national variation in this result is modest and indicates that tax advantages are considered to 
be of equal importance to both in European and U.S. firms. A reassuring discovery is that 
firms with higher leverage and a target debt ratio are more likely to consider tax advantages of 
debt an important factor.  
The negative effects of debt financing, bankruptcy costs appear to be considered less 
important when judging by the results in Table 7. On a scale of 0 to 4, costs of bankruptcy 
scores range only between 0.65 for France and 1.42 for the Netherlands. Firms with high 
leverage seem more concerned about these costs, which is an obvious result because their 
expected bankruptcy costs are larger. The same table shows that the volatility of earnings, 
which increases the probability of bankruptcy and thus expected costs, is more important. In 
the U.S., this is the third most important factor as in the U.K. and Germany. In the 
Netherlands and France, volatility is the second most important factor. Again, the importance 
of this characteristic is related to high leverage (U.K.) and aiming for a target ratio (U.K., 
Germany and France). We find no compelling variation across countries or continents. In all 
countries we find that firms consider bankruptcy costs and tax advantages to be important. 
Finally, personal tax effects may offset or increase the tax advantage of debt and thereby 
impact the optimal balance between corporate tax effects and bankruptcy costs. The low 
scores in row (f) of Table 7 clearly show that, similar to the U.S., our European firms do not 
put much weight to the personal tax considerations of their investors. Apparently, firms do 
not try to attract specific investor clienteles through their capital structure choice. When 
including the underlying shareholder orientation of firms into this matter, we find that 
shareholder oriented firms in the Netherlands, France and Germany consider the personal tax 
issue to be more important than their competitors with low shareholder orientation. These 
differences, however, are insignificant and are reversed for U.K. firms, indicating that 
shareholder orientation does not explain much of the cross-sectional variation.  
 
5.1.2. Deviations from target debt ratios 
Our firm statistics already indicated that in the U.S. more firms have target ratios, than in 
the European countries. In the U.K., the Netherlands and Germany about two-thirds or more 
of the firms aim for some target debt ratio. However, only one third of the French firms has a 
target ratio. A striking result is that in each of the countries about 10% of the firms has a 
strict target.  
Welch (2004) argues that stock returns affect market value debt ratios, because the value 
of equity changes. Thus, in case firms express their target debt ratios in market values, they 
will have to rebalance after changes in equity value. We test this hypothesis and the results in 
row (g) of Table 8 indicate that the scores are indeed much higher in market-oriented 
countries. The U.S. and U.K. scores of 1.08 and 0.82, respectively, well exceed the other 
countries. A plausible explanation for this international variation is that the firms in the latter 
countries are less likely to be exchange-listed.  
 14
Fisher, Heinkel and Zechner (1989) argue that transaction costs prevent firms from 
frequently rebalancing their capital structure. Whether transactions costs and fees are 
important in capital structure choice is shown in Table 7, row (e). This transaction costs 
hypothesis receives moderate support, with scores ranging between 1.26 for the Netherlands 
and 1.75 for the U.K. We also ask firms whether they delay the issuance of debt because of 
transactions costs and fees, but the low values, which are stated in row (e) of Table 8, yield 
little support for this notion. Apparently transaction costs do not serve as a key driver of 
corporate debt policy. The subset of firms with a target debt ratios scores significantly higher 
in several countries in these two questions.  
 
5.2. Asymmetric information explanations of capital structure 
5.2.1 Pecking-order model of financing hierarchy 
The pecking-order model of Myers and Majluf (1984) hypothesizes a hierarchy in 
financing means. First, firms prefer internal financing. Then, external financing is preferred, 
where debt is preferred over equity. The degree of asymmetric information determines the 
relative costs of each financing source. Firms that follow this pecking order do not have a 
target debt ratio, because the ordering determines their preference regarding the issuance of 
new capital. 
Row (g) of Table 7 demonstrates that financial flexibility is the most important factor that 
influences the amount of debt in each of the five countries. This seems to be evidence of 
pecking-order behaviour. Later in this section we will discuss this issue in more detail. Our 
survey includes additional questions related to pecking-order behaviour. In row (a) of Table 8 
we inquire whether a debt issue is triggered by insufficient recent profits, the results are weak 
and scattered, ranging between 1.24 for France and 2.30 for Germany.6  
In Table 8, row (d) reports what the score is on debt issues when equity is undervalued. 
This behaviour would be consistent with pecking-order theory. Compared the 1.56 score in 
the U.S. our European firms score relatively low. Like Graham and Harvey we find that in 
large and dividend-paying firms equity valuation is more likely to influence financing 
decisions. This result nicely illustrates the role of security pricing in public markets, which is 
much lower in continental Europe. 
Overall, our results for the pecking-order model confirm Graham and Harvey’s 
conclusions: results are in line with the predictions of the pecking-order theory. However, 
given the results on information differences, asymmetries do not drive the pecking order. 
According to signaling models, firms can signal their quality to investors using their capital 
                                                 
6 Similar weak results are found linking recent profits the considering of the issuance of new equity. For firms 
that considered issuing equity, we find that the inability of obtaining debt financing is even less important when 
considering a new equity issue. The amount by which firm’s stock is being undervalued or overvalued appears to 
be more important when considering an equity offer. Firms that seriously consider issuing common stock value 
the importance of the current stock valuation between 1.69 in the Netherlands and 2.69 in the U.S., making it the 
second most important consideration (results not reported). 
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structure decisions.7 Table 8, row (b) illustrates that this motivation scores low, between 0.65 
in the Netherlands and 1.06 in France, in all samples when relating it to debt policy.8  
 
5.2.2. Anticipating improvement in credit ratings 
Flannery (1986) argues that managers who expect a higher credit rating than their current 
rating - because they have superior information -  will choose short debt, as their rates for 
long debt will improve. Table 9, row (e) shows that this argument receives only weak support, 
only a small minority of all firms in each sample consider this argument to be relevant. The 
respondents most likely interpreted credit ratings in a broad way, because in continental 
Europe rating agencies are less active, in comparison with Anglo-Saxon countries. However, 
the results for this question are similar. 
 
5.2.3. Market timing interest rates 
In the previous section we inquired about timing on the basis of private information 
within a firm. Managers may also try to time their issues because they expect that economy-
wide interest rates may change. Row (c) of Table 8 yields the surprising result that this is the 
most important factor in U.S. firms, with a score of 2.22. The scores for the European 
countries tend to be considerably lower with Germany on the high end with 1.87, whereas 
Dutch firms report only 1.19 on average.  
In Table 9 we ask firms about factors, which affect their choice between short- and long-
term debt. Rows (a) and (c) report the influence of expected long and short interest rates in 
this context and again we find higher values for slightly lower values for our European firms 
compared to the U.S. results of Graham and Harvey.9 
 
5.3. Agency costs 
5.3.1. Conflicts between bondholders and equityholders 
The underinvestment problem, as introduced by Myers (1977), is an agency problem 
between bondholders and shareholder that arises in situations of debt overhang. In firms with 
good growth opportunities, new projects will not be started if leverage is high. The 
motivation is that in these situations bondholder will benefit more than the shareholders. In 
Table 7, row (n) we ask our respondents whether they restrict their borrowing such that 
profits from new projects can be captured fully by shareholders instead of being paid out as 
interest to bondholders. The low scores in the range of 0.73 for the Netherlands and 1.30 for 
the U.K. offer little support for this notion. Because the problem is induced by high leverage 
we expect that the underinvestment problem is more relevant in the high leverage samples. In 
France we indeed find significantly different scores of 2.17 and 1.13, indicating that 
underinvestment matters more in highly levered firms. However, for Germany we find the 
                                                 
7 See Ross, 1977 and Leland and Pyle, 1977.  
8 Focusing on firms intended to issues equity yields comparable results, indicating that the firms in our sample do 
not actively signal information on their corporate prospects and value through their capital structure policy 
(results not reported).  
9 We also find for firms that considered to issue foreign debt do so because foreign rates are more favourable 
(results not tabled). The scores are much higher in the U.S. (2.19), the Netherlands (2.42) and Germany (2.64), in 
comparison with the U.K. (1.36) and France (1.38). 
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inverse difference, which is also significant at the 10% level. Myers’ (1977) model also implies 
that this underinvestment problem can be mitigated by short term financing. In row (d) of 
Table 9 we test this hypothesis and the results are in line with our earlier findings, again scores 
are consistently below 1.00.  
Asset substitution is another agency problem in which shareholder prefer high-risk 
projects, because they can fully benefit from the upside potential. On the other hand, 
bondholders have a fixed claim and prefer projects with lower risk. Leland and Toft (1996) 
model this problem and find short-term debt as a solution. Table 9, row (f) reports low 
scores, well below 1.00, in each of the five countries.10 The results for the five countries are 
remarkably similar. By constructing an anti-director index La Porta et al. (1998) show that 
shareholders have a much larger influence in U.S. and U.K. firms. One would expect 
shareholder-bondholder problems in countries with high shareholder influence and low 
creditor rights, i.e. the U.S. In Germany, one would expect the problems to be less relevant. 
Given these strong institutional differences, it is striking that the theories are not found to be 
relevant in either of the countries. 
 
5.3.2. Conflicts between managers and equityholders 
Jensen (1986) notices that managers may have incentives to strive for firm growth by 
adopting negative NPV projects. Moreover, Jensen and Meckling (1976) argue that managers 
may work less efficiently, because they are merely partial or no owners of the firm. Through 
its fixed obligations debt is considered to be a disciplining device, which might mitigate these 
principle-agent difficulties. However, our results in row (m) of Table 7 imply that the 
disciplining role of debt is equally unimportant in each of the five countries, where scores 
never exceed 0.70. Graham and Harvey attribute the U.S. result to two reasons: (1) 
respondents’ bias because managers do not want to admit this behaviour; and (2) 
unwillingness of managers to discipline themselves through debt. It is noteworthy that the 
above-mentioned anti-director index of La Porta et al. (1998) again does not induce cross-
country differences.  
 
5.4. Multivariate regression analysis 
In the previous analyses we have noted that cross-country differences arise in our results. 
We also found that a target ratio and leverage influence the respondents’ choices. Two 
important models seem to be relevant, i.e. the pecking order model and the static trade-off 
model. We will now discuss these models in more detail. Moreover, we estimate whether the 
choices are driven by cross-country differences or by firm characteristics. 
As mentioned before, row (g) of Table 7 demonstrates that financial flexibility is the most 
important factor that influences the amount of debt in each of the five countries, with scores 
between 2.59 in the U.S. and 1.84 in France. On the one hand, this seems to be evidence in 
favour of the pecking-order model, since flexibility increases the possibility to choose 
between different financing alternatives. On the other hand, Opler et al. (1999) show that 
                                                 
10 Green (1984) has developed a prominent model in which asset substitution is mitigated by convertible debt 
issues. We find in unreported analyses that protecting bondholders against unfavourable actions of shareholders 
and managers is not an important factor in the convertible debt choice, again the results are consistent and are 
equal or less than 1.00. 
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flexibility may be important for other reasons than the pecking order. In Table 10 we report a 
regression test in which a dummy for a high score (3 and 4) on flexibility is explained by 
country dummies. In order to avoid perfect multicollinearity we omit the Netherlands. The 
results yield no significant country dummies, which is in line with our earlier findings. In 
Model 2 we add firm characteristics. Interesting is that flexibility is significantly (at the 10% 
level) more important in firms with a target debt ratio. This finding contradicts the pecking-
order interpretation of this question. A more detailed test of the pecking order is to 
investigate the relationship between asymmetric information and the desire for flexibility. 
Graham and Harvey use size and dividends as proxies for information problems, i.e. larger 
and dividend-paying firms have less asymmetry. Therefore, larger firms and dividend-payers 
are expected to score lower on flexibility. We find the inverse, as both size and dividends 
have positive coefficients (the coefficient for dividends is significant at the 1% level). The 
result is similar to the uni-variate comparisons in the U.S. where larger firms score 
(insignificantly) higher and also dividend-payers score higher (significant at the 1% level). 
These results corroborate with Graham Harvey’s conclusion that the desire for financial 
flexibility is not driven by the pecking-order theory.11 
Firms that adopt the static trade-off model do so in two steps. First they decide to set a 
target capital structure. Then they choose factors that are included in the trade-off for the 
optimal capital structure. In Table 10 we investigate which factors induce firms to set a target 
capital structure. Model 1 contains country dummies and shows that French firms are 
significantly less likely to set a target. After including firm characteristics we find that leverage, 
size and dividends have a positive impact on the probability of aiming for a target, significant 
at the 1% level. In theory, no models exist that predict which firms have a target and which 
firms do not.12 As far as we know, we are the first to document empirically that targets are 
most likely set by large, highly-levered, dividend-paying firms. Adding the cross-sectional 
variation in shareholder orientation does not attribute to explaining the target setting 
dilemma.  
Under the static trade-off theory firms trade off tax advantages and bankruptcy costs. We 
estimate the relations between country dummies plus firm characteristics and these factors. 
Another set of factors are the agency models, but our summary statistics already revealed that 
these are of minor importance. Our regression results show that in Germany the tax 
advantage is less important. However, the next regression in Model 2 illustrates that the result 
is driven by cross-country differences in firm characteristics. After including additional 
variables the coefficient for Germany looses most of its significance. Obviously, the presence 
of a target significantly increases the probability that tax issues are important. Also large firms 
appear to find tax advantages more relevant. Bankruptcy costs are the cost of leverage in the 
static trade-off and measured as the probability that a firm considers the costs of bankruptcy 
(Table 7, row (b)) or the likelihood (Table 7, row (h)) important. Again we find that these 
                                                 
11 Brav et al. (2003) argue that the levels of dividends are nearly untouchable. This implies that paying dividends 
reduces the flexibility of firms, which explains the positive relation we report between the importance of 
flexibility and dividends.  
12 Additional regression analysis shows that the relationship between firm size and the probability of aiming at a 
capital structure target is significantly stronger for our European firms than among the U.S. firms of Graham and 
Harvey (2001).  
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costs are less relevant in Germany, but this difference reduces after extending the estimation 
model. As expected, we also find a significantly positive effect for firms with a target. 
The regression results in Table 10 also include a dummy variable for shareholder-
orientation, which is insignificant in each of the four models. This contrasts with the capital 
budgeting results. Although both decisions have implications for shareholder wealth, the link 
is much more direct in capital budgeting. 
A comparison between the variables for countries and the firm characteristics show that 
countries matter, but tell only part of the story. For flexibility, countries have no effect and 
for tax advantages the single significant coefficient becomes insignificant once other variables 
are included. Judging from the R2’s, the country-effects explain much less of the variation, in 
comparison with the other firm-level characteristics. 
In Europe we document the following conclusions regarding capital structure practices. 
We find moderate support for the static trade-off theory, which predicts that firms have a 
target debt ratio, based on tax and bankruptcy considerations. In the U.S. the strongest 
evidence is found, both for the existence of targets and for the role of corporate taxes. The 
pecking order theory is rejected in each of the countries. However, the result of this theory, 
the desire for financial flexibility, is an important consideration in all countries. But, because 
asymmetric information problems do not drive this desire, pecking order theory cannot 
explain this result. The relevance of agency problems and the benefits of signaling in capital 
structure choice are caused by divergent interests and the ability of shareholders and creditors 
to monitor each other and the management. Although recent studies suggest strong 
differences between the countries, we do not find convincing evidence of agency problems, 
signaling, or a role of capital structure in control contests in either country. This is a striking 
result because current theoretical and empirical literature largely focuses on these issues. 
We conclude that the static trade-off theory faces moderate confirmation. Financial 
flexibility is important, but not driven by the pecking order theory. Several practical 
considerations are highly relevant. Contrary to the institutional variations we document strong 
resemblances between the five very different countries when comparing capital structure 
policies. Differences emerge in the relevance of the public financial markets. In the U.S. and 
U.K., and to a lesser extent in the Netherlands, firms use the stock prices and interest rates in 
their decisions, while in Germany and France internal considerations appear to be are more 
relevant. 
 
6. Conclusions  
In this paper we examine the practice of corporate finance in four European countries: the 
U.K., the Netherlands, Germany and France and compare these practices with previous 
results of Graham and Harvey (2001) for U.S. firms. Our results offer a rare opportunity to 
directly investigate the use and adoption of academic concepts by professionals active outside 
the United States. The contribution of this paper therefore is multiple. First professionals can 
learn by observing the practice of their European colleagues. Second our survey reveals where 
theoretical concepts fall short in tackling practical dilemmas, and thereby this paper can 
inspire academics in extending and refining existing notions. Third, we analyze the extend to 
which existing insights that originate from numerous U.S. studies hold outside the United 
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States, and reveal what factors are really driving the practice of financial management in firms. 
Several studies have stressed the differences between institutional settings, when comparing 
the United States and Europe. These studies claim that these institutional differences 
determine how firm manage their capital and therefore create an international variation in 
corporate finance practice. We have tested whether European firms and U.S. firms are 
different, and which characteristics explain corporate policies regarding capital budgeting, 
cost of capital and capital structure.  
We observe a remarkable cross-national pattern with respect to corporate governance. 
Firms in the U.K. and the Netherlands are consciously thriving at maximizing their 
shareholder’s wealth, while German and French firms attach a low priority to this corporate 
goal. Regarding the corporate finance practices we find remarkably little difference across 
countries. With respect to capital budgeting techniques we discover a strong preference for 
the simple payback criterion among our European firms. Although this preference is stronger 
in Europe it does not differ significantly from capital budgeting policies of U.S. firms. We 
find that this preference for payback criteria is consistently stronger among small firms and 
among firms, which are less oriented towards shareholder wealth maximization. Of the firms 
that do discount their cash-flow forecast, most CFOs responded to be using the CAPM when 
computing their cost of equity capital. This preference of CAPM over more intuitive 
alternatives is comparable to how U.S. firms compute the cost of capital. The use of CAPM 
tends rise with firm size, CEO tenure, and the importance of shareholder wealth 
maximization, while the educational background of the CEO appears to be irrelevant. Finally 
regarding capital structure policy we find surprisingly little continental differences. Although 
recent studies by La Porta et al. (1997, 1998) and Rajan and Zingales (2003a, 2003b) have 
illustrated the institutional variation that is present within our international sample. These 
differences seem to have little affect on firm’s capital structure practice. Financial flexibility is 
reported to be the most important factor, when determining the proper of amount of 
corporate debt. On the other hand this urge for flexibility is not driven by the pecking order 
theory. Furthermore, we find no evidence for agency theories, signaling, or a role of capital 
structure in control contest.  
Alike Graham and Harvey (2001) we document fundamental differences between large 
and small firms when analyzing corporate finance practices. Our results show that large firms 
are likely to use more sophisticated techniques when it comes to evaluating risky projects. In 
all samples we find that large firms are more likely to use NPV criteria and the CAPM for 
calculating the proper discount rate. Moreover, our results show that large firms are apt to 
utilizing more sophisticated, risk-matched discount rates instead of a standard firm cost of 
capital. This consistent difference in corporate finance practice along the size dimension is an 
intriguing result, which might help us to understand the well-documented size anomalies in 
the asset pricing literature.   
In both the U.S. and European markets professionals tend to adopt and neglect the same 
theoretical models and theories when managing their finances. The gap between science and 
practice appears to be rather constant across borders and although institutional difference are 
large and significant, they do not seem to dominate the way firms are run financially.         
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Figure 1: Corporate goals and important stakeholders 
These tables summarize the national average responses to the questions: “Which goals are important for your firm?” and “Which 
stakeholders are important for your firm?” 
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Figure 2: Firm characteristics (continued)
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Figure 1:  Sample characteristics (continued)
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Table 1: Summary statistsics and cross correlations 
A: Summary statistics U.S. (n=392) 
U.K. 
(n=68) 
NL 
(n=52) 
GER 
(n=132) 
FR 
(n=61) N 
Public 63% 54% 41% 23% 12% 705 
Regulated Utility 7% 10% 7% 17% 29% 705 
Pays Dividend 53% 61% 75% 52% 71% 705 
Rating investment grade 79% 87% 77% 80% 69% 705 
       
Large Size1 42% 15% 19% 12% 15% 705 
MBA educated 38% 16% 44% 43% 38% 705 
Shareholder orientated NA 90% 87% 53% 53% 313 
High leverage2 30% 29% 37% 34% 18% 705 
Target ratio3 81% 59% 73% 70% 35% 705 
  
B: Cross-correlations Public  Regulated Utility Pays Dividend 
Rating 
investment 
grade 
Size MBA Shareholder orientation 
High 
leverage Target ratio 
Regulated Utility -0.08 1.00 0.03 0.08 0.06 0.04 -0.14 0.01 0.11 
Pays Dividend 0.17 0.03 1.00 0.14 0.19 0.05 0.14 0.06 0.16 
Rating investment grade 0.13 0.08 0.14 1.00 0.38 0.01 0.06 0.11 0.21 
Size 0.28 0.06 0.19 0.38 1.00 0.05 0.13 0.03 0.19 
MBA 0.05 0.04 0.05 0.01 0.05 1.00 0.09 0.04 0.02 
Shareholder orientation 0.27 -0.14 0.14 0.06 0.13 0.09 1.00 0.11 0.03 
High leverage -0.04 0.01 0.06 0.11 0.03 0.04 0.11 1.00 0.27 
Target ratio 0.11 -0.03 0.16 0.21 0.19 0.02 0.03 0.27 1.00 
1 Large firms are firms with annual sales exceeding 1 billion U.S. dollars. 
2 We classify firms with long-term debt ratios exceeding 30% as high levered firms. 
3 Firms, which anounced to have strict or even tight target debt ratios are classified as ‘target ratio’. 
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Table 2                     
Survey responses to the question "How frequently does your firm use the following techniques when deciding which projects or acquisitions to pursue?"        
                      
  U.S.  U.K.  Netherlands 
                      
  % always Size CEO MBA  % always Size CEO MBA  % always Size CEO MBA 
  or almost      or almost      or almost     
  always Mean Small Large Yes No  always Mean Small Large Yes No  always Mean Small Large Yes No 
                      
(b) Internal rate of return 75.61 3.09 2.87 3.41*** 3.17 3.03  53.13 2.31 3.33 2.15*** 1.70 2.50  56.00 2.36 2.25 2.80 2.73 2.07* 
(a) Net present value 74.93 3.08 2.83 3.42*** 3.17 3.00*  46.97 2.32 2.12 3.56*** 2.18 2.45  70.00 2.76 2.53 3.70*** 2.86 2.68 
(f) Payback period 56.74 2.53 2.72 2.25*** 2.48 2.55  69.23 2.77 2.77 2.75 2.73 2.74  64.71 2.53 2.56 2.40 2.86 2.28 
(c) Hurdle rate 56.94 2.48 2.13 2.95*** 2.57 2.42  26.98 1.35 1.07 3.00*** 0.80 1.49  41.67 1.98 1.74 2.90* 2.36 1.65 
(j) Sensitivity analysis 51.54 2.31 2.13 2.56*** 2.41 2.25  42.86 2.21 2.02 3.50*** 1.60 2.35  36.73 1.84 1.74 2.20 1.91 1.78 
(d) Earnings multiple approach 38.92 1.89 1.89 2.01* 1.98 1.86  39.06 1.81 1.78 2.00 1.90 1.90  26.53 1.61 1.56 1.80 1.82 1.44 
(g) Discounted payback period 29.45 1.56 1.56 1.55 1.68 1.49  25.40 1.49 1.56 1.00 2.20 1.31*  25.00 1.25 1.32 1.00 1.27 1.23 
(l) We incorporate the "real options" of 
a project when evaluating it 
26.56 1.47 1.47 1.57 1.49 1.39  29.03 1.65 1.67 1.50 2.09 1.49  34.69 1.49 1.62 1.00 1.57 1.43 
(i) Accounting rate of return 20.29 1.34 1.34 1.25 1.42 1.29  38.10 1.79 1.82 1.63 1.30 1.90  25.00 1.40 1.45 1.20 1.27 1.50 
(k) Value at risk 13.66 0.95 0.95 1.22*** 0.99 0.88  14.52 0.85 0.72 1.75* 0.80 0.94  4.26 0.51 0.47 0.67 0.71 0.35 
(e) Adjusted present value 10.78 0.85 0.85 0.72* 0.74 0.91*  14.06 0.78 0.71 1.22 1.20 0.76  8.16 0.78 0.74 0.90 0.73 0.81 
(h) Profitability index 11.87 0.85 0.83 0.75 0.83 0.85  15.87 1.00 1.15 0.00*** 1.60 0.92  8.16 0.78 0.82 0.60 0.77 0.78 
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Table 2 - continued           
Survey responses to the question "How frequently does your firm use the following techniques when deciding which projects or acquisitions to pursue?" 
            
  Germany  France        
                      
  % always Size CEO MBA  % always Size CEO MBA        
  or almost      or almost            
  always Mean Small Large Yes No  always Mean Small Large Yes No        
                      
(b) Internal rate of return 42.15 2.15 2.04 3.08** 2.40 1.97*  44.07 2.27 2.18 2.88 2.82 1.95**        
(a) Net present value 47.58 2.26 2.08 3.64*** 2.70 1.93***  35.09 1.86 1.63 3.25*** 2.30 1.62        
(f) Payback period 50.00 2.29 2.31 2.08 2.40 2.21  50.88 2.46 2.51 2.13 2.52 2.42        
(c) Hurdle rate 28.81 1.61 1.52 2.31 1.59 1.62  3.85 0.73 0.80 0.17** 0.76 0.71        
(j) Sensitivity analysis 28.07 1.65 1.58 2.15 2.04 1.37***  10.42 0.79 0.85 0.43 0.50 0.97        
(d) Earnings multiple approach 20.51 1.25 1.18 1.77 1.47 1.09  33.33 1.70 1.73 1.50 1.84 1.63        
(g) Discounted payback period 30.51 1.59 1.50 2.31* 1.57 1.61  11.32 0.87 0.91 0.57 1.11 0.74        
(l) We incorporate the "real options" of 
a project when evaluating it 
44.04 2.24 2.28 1.92 2.22 2.25  53.06 2.20 2.27 1.88 2.05 2.30        
(i) Accounting rate of return 32.17 1.63 1.76 0.62*** 1.46 1.76  16.07 1.11 1.16 0.71 1.15 1.08        
(k) Value at risk 23.68 1.45 1.36 2.15** 1.73 1.24*  29.79 1.68 1.66 1.83 2.00 1.50        
(e) Adjusted present value 7.83 0.71 0.63 1.38* 0.96 0.54**  14.55 1.11 1.12 1.00 1.53 0.89*        
(h) Profitability index 16.07 1.04 1.00 1.31 0.98 1.08  37.74 1.64 1.63 1.71 2.00 1.46        
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Table 3           
Survey responses to the question "Does your firm estimate the cost of equity capital? If “yes”, how do you determine your firm’s cost of equity capital?"     
            
  U.S. U.K. Netherlands Germany France 
            
  % always  % always  % always  % always  % always  
  or almost or almost or almost or almost or almost 
  always Mean always Mean always Mean always Mean always Mean 
            
(b) Using the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM, the beta approach) 73.49 2.92 47.06 2.06 55.56 2.37 33.96 1.36 45.16 1.90 
(a) With average historical returns on common stock 39.41 1.72 31.25 1.47 30.77 1.42 18.00 1.06 27.27 1.30 
(c) Using the CAPM  but including some extra “risk factors” 34.29 1.56 27.27 1.45 15.38 1.08 16.07 0.89 30.30 1.39 
(f) Back out from discounted dividend/earnings model, e.g.: price = div./(cost of cap. growth) 15.74 0.91 10.00 0.73 10.71 0.79 10.42 0.58 10.34 0.69 
(d) Whatever our investors tell us they require 13.93 0.86 18.75 1.19 44.83 1.86 39.22 1.98 34.38 1.66 
(e) By regulatory decisions 7.04 0.44 16.13 0.94 3.70 0.33 0.00 0.27 16.13 0.87 
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Table 4                    
Survey responses to the question "When valuing a project, do you adjust either the discount rate or cash flows for the following risk factors?" Percentage of respondents choosing each category is reported 
                     
   U.S.  U.K.  Netherlands     
                     
   Disc. 
rate 
Cash 
flow 
Both Neither  Disc. 
rate 
Cash 
flow 
Both Neither  Disc. 
rate 
Cash 
flow 
Both Neither     
                    
(b) Interest rate risk (change in general level of 
interest rates) 
15.30 8.78 24.65 51.27  20.97 27.42 27.42 24.19  20.41 8.16 20.41 51.02     
(f) Foreign exchange risk  10.80 15.34 18.75 55.11  12.50 32.81 17.19 37.50  6.00 26.00 18.00 50.00     
(d) GDP or business cycle risk  6.84 18.80 18.80 55.56  16.13 24.19 8.06 51.61  8.33 6.25 10.42 75.00     
(a) Risk of unexpected inflation  11.90 14.45 11.90 61.76  17.74 25.81 12.90 43.55  8.00 12.00 16.00 64.00     
(h) Size (small firms being riskier)  14.57 6.00 13.43 66.00  21.88 12.50 7.81 57.81  17.02 14.89 14.89 53.19     
(e) Commodity price risk  2.86 18.86 10.86 67.43  19.05 19.05 7.94 53.97  2.13 19.15 10.64 68.09     
(c) Term structure risk (change in the long-term vs. 
short-term interest rate) 
8.57 3.71 12.57 75.14  17.19 17.19 12.50 53.13  10.64 0.00 10.64 78.72     
(g) Distress risk (probability of bankruptcy) 7.41 6.27 4.84 81.48  14.52 9.68 6.45 69.35  14.58 4.17 8.33 72.92     
(i) "Market-to-book" ratio (ratio of market value of 
firm to book value of assets) 
3.98 1.99 7.10 86.93  17.74 9.68 4.84 67.74  4.26 2.13 19.15 74.47     
(j) Momentum (recent stock price performance) 3.43 2.86 4.86 88.86  16.95 5.08 6.78 71.19  4.35 0.00 8.70 86.96     
                     
   Germany  France          
                     
   Disc. 
rate 
Cash 
flow 
Both Neither  Disc. 
rate 
Cash 
flow 
Both Neither          
                    
(b) Interest rate risk (change in general level of 
interest rates) 
26.72 14.66 22.41 36.21  23.21 26.79 21.43 28.57          
(f) Foreign exchange risk  13.27 19.47 18.58 48.67  16.36 20.00 5.45 58.18          
(d) GDP or business cycle risk  6.19 9.73 11.50 72.57  15.79 22.81 12.28 49.12          
(a) Risk of unexpected inflation  18.80 9.40 9.40 62.39  17.54 24.56 26.32 31.58          
(h) Size (small firms being riskier)  9.91 9.01 12.61 68.47  23.64 16.36 10.91 49.09          
(e) Commodity price risk  4.39 26.32 16.67 52.63  8.62 46.55 12.07 32.76          
(c) Term structure risk (change in the long-term vs. 
short-term interest rate) 
17.12 7.21 8.11 67.57  22.81 12.28 17.54 47.37          
(g) Distress risk (probability of bankruptcy) 8.77 14.04 13.16 64.04  12.50 23.21 14.29 50.00          
(i) "Market-to-book" ratio (ratio of market value of 
firm to book value of assets) 
4.63 8.33 12.96 74.07  20.00 12.73 12.73 54.55          
(j) Momentum (recent stock price performance) 5.66 0.94 3.77 89.62  27.78 3.70 7.41 61.11          
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Table 5                     
Survey responses to the question "How frequently would your company use the following discount rates when evaluating a new project in an overseas market? To evaluate this project we would use…"  
                      
  U.S.  U.K.  Netherlands 
                      
   % always  Size CEO MBA  % always  Size CEO MBA  % always  Size CEO MBA 
   or almost      or almost      or almost     
   always Mean Small Large Yes No  always Mean Small Large Yes No  always Mean Small Large Yes No 
                       
(a) The discount rate for our entire company  58.79 2.50 2.50 2.50 2.49 2.51  40.98 1.97 1.87 2.63 1.80 1.88  64.58 2.48 2.37 2.90 2.55 2.43 
(d) A risk-matched discount rate for this particular project 
(considering both country and industry) 
50.95 2.09 1.86 2.36*** 2.20 1.99  23.73 1.17 1.04 1.89 1.78 1.04  27.08 1.27 1.13 1.80 1.05 1.44 
(b) The discount rate for the overseas market (country 
discount rate) 
34.52 1.65 1.49 1.82** 1.77 1.60  20.00 0.97 0.88 1.44 2.33 0.77**  14.89 1.09 0.92 1.70 1.38 0.85 
(c) A divisional discount rate ( if the project line of business 
matches a domestic division) 
15.61 0.95 0.82 1.09** 0.88 0.98  17.24 0.91 0.82 1.44 1.33 0.89  17.02 0.96 0.68 2.11** 1.40 0.63* 
(e) A different discount rate for each component cashflow 
that has a different risk characteristic (e.g.: depreciation 
vs. operating cash flows) 
9.87 0.66 0.68 0.64 0.59 0.67  10.53 0.58 0.61 0.38 1.33 0.47  2.13 0.26 0.22 0.40 0.38 0.15 
                      
                      
  Germany  France        
                      
  % always  Size CEO MBA  % always  Size CEO MBA        
  or almost      or almost            
  always Mean Small Large Yes No  always Mean Small Large Yes No        
                      
(a) The discount rate for our entire company 41.96 2.00 1.89 2.79* 2.15 1.89  24.14 1.03 0.88 1.89 1.36 0.83        
(d) A risk-matched discount rate for this particular project 
(considering both country and industry) 
25.00 1.16 1.00 2.31** 1.58 0.85**  27.27 1.16 1.06 1.75 1.57 0.91        
(b) The discount rate for the overseas market (country 
discount rate) 
14.85 0.92 0.81 1.69* 0.98 0.88  16.36 0.76 0.53 2.13** 0.90 0.69        
(c) A divisional discount rate ( if the project line of business 
matches a domestic division) 
12.00 0.69 0.67 0.85 0.77 0.63  12.50 0.70 0.60 1.25 1.24 0.37**        
(e) A different discount rate for each component cashflow 
that has a different risk characteristic (e.g.: depreciation 
vs. operating cash flows) 
7.14 0.51 0.47 0.83 0.83 0.27*** 11.32 0.62 0.54 1.14 0.79 0.53        
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Table 6: Multivariate Probit regression output for capital budgeting 
 
 Capital Budgeting  Cost of Capital  CAPM Discount rate 
 Full Sample EU  Full Sample EU  Full Sample EU  Full Sample EU 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Constant    0,79***   0,59** 0,24  0,19 0,07 -0,35    -0,56***   -0,89***   -1,14***  -0,34*   -0,51**   -0,96*** 
 (4,00) (2,82) (0,95)  (1,11) (0,36) (-1,48)  (-3,03) (-4,30) (-4,15)  (-1,85) (-2,67) (-3,72) 
Germany-dummy   -0,55**   -0,51** -0,37  -0,25 -0,21 -0,05   -0,38* -0,31 -0,22 -0,13 -0,10 0,03 
 (-2,41) (-2,16) (-1,52)  (-1,22) (-0,98) (-0,21)  (-1,69) (-1,32) (-0,89)  (-0,60) (-0,45) (0,13) 
France-dummy   -0,66***   -0,66**  -0,53*  -0,05 -0,03 0,15  0,07 0,15 0,25 -0,22 -0,20 -0,05 
 (-2,59) (-2,50) (-1,92)  (-0,21) (-0,12) (0,58)  (0,27) (0,59) (0,93)  (-0,87) (-0,78) (-0,21) 
U.K.-dummy -0,31 -0,26 -0,29  -0,16 -0,15 -0,18  -0,03 0,09 0,08 -0,12 -0,05 -0,05 
 (-1,24) (-0,97) (-1,07)  (-0,68) (-0,64) (-0,73)    (-0,11) (0,34) (0,31)  (-0,49) (-0,21) (-0,18) 
U.S.-dummy   1,03***    0,95***  0,18 -0,04     0,79***   0,56***   0,48**   0,36* 
 (4,43) (3,84) 
- 
 (0,97) (-0,20) 
- 
 (4,00) (2,63) 
- 
 (2,45) (1,77) 
- 
Size    1,22***    1,35***     1,01***    1,09***    1,11***   1,19***    0,45***   0,54** 
 
- 
(4,47) (3,81)  
- 
(7,77) (4,40)  
- 
(8,73) (-5,61)  
- 
(3,73) (2,47) 
MBA 0,13 0,09  -0,07 -0,09  0,15 0,12 0,18 0,26 
 
- 
(0,92) (0,57)  
- 
(-0,60) (-0,56)  
- 
(1,25) (0,70)  
- 
(1,60) (1,53) 
Shareholder orientated (EU)   0,43**     0,49***  0,27   0,46** 
 
- - 
(2,47)  
- - 
(2,92)  
- - 
(1,39)  
- - 
(2,30) 
           
N 678 652 303  672 648 313  624 601 313  603 578 283 
McFadden R-squared 0,22 0,27 0,10  0,02 0,09 0,08  0,10 0,20 0,13  0,04 0,06 0,05 
Akaike info criterion 0,75 0,72 1,22  1,35 1,26 1,32  1,24 1,10 1,01  1,33 1,31 1,24 
Models 1 and 2 employ a pooled data set in which our European sample is merged with the U.S. Model 3 exclusively focuses on the European sample. The dummy for capital budgeting has 
value one if at least one response to the questions a, b, e or g of Table 2 exceeds 2, or zero otherwise. The dummy for cost of capital equals one if respondents indicate that they calculate the 
cost of capital, and zero otherwise. The dummy for CAPM has value one if at least one response to the questions b or c of Table 3 exceeds 2, and zero otherwise. The dummy for discount 
rate equals one if at least one response to the question c, d or e of Table 5 exceeds 2, or zero otherwise. The dummies of the control variables size, MBA, and shareholder orientation are 
defined as in Table 1. Additional regressions are available on our website. The McFadden R-squared is the likelihood ratio index and is an analogue to the R-squared reported in linear 
regression models. The Akaike info criterion provides a measure of information that strikes a balance between this measure of goodness of fit and parsimonious specification of the model, 
the lower the value the better the fit of the model. Coefficient estimates marked with *, **, *** are statistically significant at a 10%, 5%, and 1% confidence level. 
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Table 7                   
Survey responses to the question "What factors affect how you choose the appropriate amount of debt for your firm?"           
                    
  U.S. U.K. Netherlands 
                    
   Leverage Target debt  Leverage Target debt  Leverage Target debt 
  % always   ratio % always   ratio % always   ratio 
  or almost    or almost    or almost    
  always Mean Low High No Yes always Mean Low High No Yes always Mean Low High No Yes 
                    
(g) Financial flexibility (we restrict debt so we have 
enough internal funds available to pursue new 
projects when they come along) 
59.38 2.59 2.61 2.60 2.63 2.54 50.00 2.13 1.88 2.83** 1.32 2.63*** 51.06 2.32 2.41 2.17 2.29 2.33 
(d) Our credit rating (as assigned by rating agencies) 57.10 2.46 2.29 2.64** 2.19 2.73*** 27.42 1.48 1.36 1.63 1.00 1.77** 34.04 1.53 1.14 2.17* 1.29 1.64 
(h) The volatility of our earnings and cash flows 48.08 2.32 2.25 2.32 2.34 2.26 35.48 1.73 1.29 2.26** 1.12 2.17*** 42.55 2.06 2.14 1.94 1.79 2.18 
(a) The tax advantage of interest deductibility 44.85 2.07 1.99 2.26** 2.03 2.13 30.16 1.68 1.41 2.21* 0.76 2.33*** 37.50 1.90 1.93 1.84 1.36 2.12 
(e) The transactions costs and fees for issuing debt 33.52 1.95 1.94 1.87 2.02 1.89 25.40 1.68 1.29 2.11** 1.04 2.06*** 15.22 1.26 1.25 1.28 0.92 1.39 
(c) The debt levels of other firms in our industry 23.40 1.49 1.36 1.70*** 1.37 1.60** 16.13 1.11 1.12 1.00 0.84 1.34* 26.53 1.37 0.87 2.16*** 0.60 1.71*** 
(b) The potential costs of bankruptcy, near-bankruptcy, 
or financial distress 
21.35 1.24 1.16 1.37** 1.32 1.19 30.16 1.37 0.88 2.16*** 0.80 1.81*** 27.08 1.42 1.38 1.47 1.00 1.59 
(i) We limit debt so our customers/suppliers are not 
worried about our firm going out of business 
18.72 1.24 1.34 1.20 1.27 1.24 34.43 1.62 1.27 2.06** 1.08 2.03*** 8.33 0.96 0.93 1.00 0.80 1.03 
(n) We restrict our borrowing so that profits from 
new/future projects can be captured fully by 
shareholders and do not have to be paid out as 
interest to debtholders 
12.57 1.01 1.18 0.83*** 1.03 0.99 21.05 1.30 1.27 1.29 1.08 1.44 8.89 0.73 0.86 0.50 0.92 0.66 
(j) We try to have enough debt that we are not an 
attractive takeover target 
4.75 0.73 0.62 0.90*** 0.71 0.77 0.00 0.58 0.53 0.71 0.32 0.79** 2.13 0.38 0.24 0.61 0.21 0.45 
(f) The personal tax cost our investors face when they 
receive interest income 
4.79 0.68 0.68 0.63 0.73 0.58* 3.23 0.65 0.50 0.68 0.52 0.69 4.35 0.61 0.68 0.50 0.29 0.75* 
(k) If we issue debt our competitors know that we are 
very unlikely to reduce our output/sales 
2.25 0.40 0.33 0.47** 0.44 0.36 3.33 0.60 0.55 0.74 0.60 0.64 0.00 0.24 0.21 0.29 0.15 0.27 
(m) To ensure that upper management works hard and 
efficiently, we issue sufficient debt to make sure that 
a large portion of our cash flow is committed to 
interest payments 
1.69 0.33 0.22 0.49*** 0.34 0.34 4.84 0.52 0.47 0.47 0.52 0.49 2.22 0.27 0.21 0.35 0.00 0.36*** 
(l) A high debt ratio helps us bargain for concessions 
from our employees 
0.00 0.16 0.13 0.19* 0.16 0.18 0.00 0.27 0.29 0.21 0.32 0.23 0.00 0.24 0.24 0.24 0.23 0.24 
 The percentage of CFOs who consider a factor important or very important is reported.
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Table 7 - continued                   
Survey responses to the question "What factors affect how you choose the appropriate amount of debt for your firm?"           
             
  Germany France 
              
   Leverage Target debt  Leverage Target debt 
  % always   ratio % always   ratio 
  or almost     or almost     
  always Mean Low High No Yes always Mean Low High No Yes 
              
(g) Financial flexibility (we restrict debt so we have 
enough internal funds available to pursue new 
projects when they come along) 
47.83 2.17 2.21 2.09 2.17 2.16 37.25 1.84 1.81 2.00 1.61 2.40**
(d) Our credit rating (as assigned by rating agencies) 38.60 1.85 1.71 2.07 1.08 2.21*** 30.19 1.58 1.60 1.50 1.37 2.13 
(h) The volatility of our earnings and cash flows 30.97 1.67 1.75 1.56 1.36 1.82* 34.78 1.54 1.50 1.83 1.15 2.54*** 
(a) The tax advantage of interest deductibility 21.05 1.28 1.23 1.36 1.00 1.41 29.63 1.57 1.57 1.60 1.50 1.75 
(e) The transactions costs and fees for issuing debt 26.32 1.50 1.39 1.67 1.42 1.54 21.15 1.42 1.33 1.80 1.19 2.00* 
(c) The debt levels of other firms in our industry 14.04 1.14 1.07 1.24 0.83 1.28** 12.96 1.24 1.25 1.20 1.21 1.31 
(b) The potential costs of bankruptcy, near-bankruptcy, 
or financial distress 
7.08 0.65 0.56 0.78 0.58 0.68 24.07 1.22 1.09 1.89 1.21 1.27 
(i) We limit debt so our customers/suppliers are not 
worried about our firm going out of business 
15.04 1.10 1.06 1.16 1.08 1.10 31.91 1.62 1.53 2.14 1.58 1.71 
(n) We restrict our borrowing so that profits from 
new/future projects can be captured fully by 
shareholders and do not have to be paid out as 
interest to debtholders 
19.27 1.06 1.24 0.77* 1.24 0.97 22.73 1.27 1.13 2.17* 1.19 1.50 
(j) We try to have enough debt that we are not an 
attractive takeover target 
2.68 0.48 0.27 0.80*** 0.26 0.58** 6.52 0.61 0.53 1.17 0.58 0.69 
(f) The personal tax cost our investors face when they 
receive interest income 
6.31 0.75 0.75 0.75 0.86 0.69 10.00 0.84 0.80 1.00 0.69 1.21 
(k) If we issue debt our competitors know that we are 
very unlikely to reduce our output/sales 
2.68 0.43 0.33 0.58 0.42 0.43 2.22 0.40 0.31 1.00** 0.36 0.50 
(m) To ensure that upper management works hard and 
efficiently, we issue sufficient debt to make sure that 
a large portion of our cash flow is committed to 
interest payments 
0.93 0.31 0.28 0.36 0.25 0.35 7.32 0.63 0.66 0.50 0.60 0.73 
(l) A high debt ratio helps us bargain for concessions 
from our employees 
0.92 0.30 0.28 0.34 0.28 0.32 0.00 0.41 0.32 1.00 0.47 0.25 
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Table 8               
Survey responses to the question "What other factors affect your firm’s debt policy?"            
                
   U.S.  U.K. Netherlands 
                
    Leverage Target debt   Leverage Target debt  Leverage Target debt 
   % always   ratio  % always   ratio % always   ratio 
   or almost      or almost     or almost     
   always Mean Low High No Yes  always Mean Low High No Yes always Mean Low High No Yes 
                    
(c) We issue debt when interest rates are 
particularly low 
46.35 2.22 2.13 2.29 2.30 2.12 29.31 1.53 1.24 2.17** 0.83 2.00*** 14.89 1.19 1.45 0.78** 1.29 1.15 
(a) We issue debt when our recent profits 
(internal funds) are not sufficient to fund 
our activities 
46.78 2.13 2.10 2.12 2.21 2.00 25.42 1.44 1.12 1.89* 1.04 1.76** 34.69 1.69 1.80 1.53 1.40 1.82 
(d) We use debt when our equity is undervalued 
by the market 
30.79 1.56 1.52 1.72 1.63 1.46 16.07 1.02 0.87 1.33 0.36 1.39*** 6.38 0.62 0.59 0.67 0.50 0.67 
(g) Changes in the price of our common stock 16.38 1.08 0.96 1.27** 1.16 0.99 8.93 0.82 0.81 0.83 0.30 1.16*** 4.44 0.60 0.74 0.39 0.31 0.72 
(e) We delay issuing debt because of 
transactions costs and fees 
10.17 1.06 1.09 1.00 1.13 0.99 3.64 0.75 0.77 0.78 0.45 0.88* 2.13 0.40 0.52 0.22 0.07 0.55***
(f) We delay retiring debt because of 
recapitalization costs and fees 
12.43 1.04 0.91 1.18** 1.07 0.99 0.00 0.53 0.50 0.59 0.39 0.58 2.13 0.55 0.69 0.33 0.21 0.70** 
(b) Using debt gives investors a better 
impression of our firm’s prospects than 
issuing stock 
9.83 0.96 0.91 1.09 1.01 0.91 8.77 0.91 0.82 0.94 0.52 1.19** 2.08 0.65 0.69 0.58 0.57 0.68 
(h) We issue debt when we have accumulated 
substantial profits 
1.14 0.53 0.46 0.54 0.56 0.50 3.57 0.55 0.50 0.72 0.43 0.66 2.22 0.49 0.53 0.53 0.31 0.56 
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Table 8 - continued           
Survey responses to the question "What other factors affect your firm’s debt policy?"        
            
   Germany  France 
            
    Leverage Target debt   Leverage Target debt 
   % always   ratio  % always   ratio 
   or almost      or almost     
   always Mean Low High No Yes  always Mean Low High No Yes 
              
(c) We issue debt when interest rates are 
particularly low 
32.76 1.87 1.80 1.98 1.68 1.96 24.49 1.33 1.25 1.67 1.29 1.43 
(a) We issue debt when our recent profits 
(internal funds) are not sufficient to fund 
our activities 
54.31 2.30 2.11 2.60* 1.64 2.60*** 23.53 1.24 1.13 1.64 0.97 1.81** 
(d) We use debt when our equity is undervalued 
by the market 
6.31 0.45 0.56 0.28 0.37 0.49 8.16 0.80 0.73 1.11 0.69 1.07 
(g) Changes in the price of our common stock 2.80 0.46 0.60 0.24** 0.49 0.44 4.65 0.65 0.54 1.33* 0.61 0.75 
(e) We delay issuing debt because of 
transactions costs and fees 
5.26 0.75 0.75 0.73 0.64 0.79 8.33 0.71 0.59 1.22 0.76 0.57 
(f) We delay retiring debt because of 
recapitalization costs and fees 
7.02 0.89 0.90 0.87 1.00 0.83 4.35 0.59 0.46 1.11* 0.59 0.57 
(b) Using debt gives investors a better 
impression of our firm’s prospects than 
issuing stock 
4.31 0.75 0.61 0.98*** 0.68 0.78 11.76 1.06 0.90 1.78* 0.89 1.47 
(h) We issue debt when we have accumulated 
substantial profits 
5.45 0.62 0.61 0.63 0.53 0.66 4.65 0.58 0.51 1.00 0.61 0.50 
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Table 9             
Survey responses to the question "What factors affect your firm’s choice between short-and long-term debt?"         
              
   U.S.  U.K. Netherlands 
              
   Leverage Target debt    Leverage Target debt Leverage Target debt 
   % always    ratio  % always    ratio % always    ratio 
   or almost      or almost     or almost     
   always Mean Low High No Yes always Mean Low High No Yes  always Mean Low High No Yes 
                      
(b) Matching the maturity of our debt with the 
life of our assets 
63.25 2.60 2.57 2.63 2.53 2.66 58.73 2.16 1.88 2.83** 1.50 2.54**  57.45 2.55 2.61 2.47 2.06 2.81* 
(g) We issue long-term debt to minimize the 
risk of having to refinance in “bad times” 
48.83 2.15 1.95 2.55*** 2.00 2.36*** 28.81 1.39 0.91 2.17*** 0.46 2.03***  47.62 1.90** 1.87 1.95 1.57 2.07 
(a) We issue short term when short term 
interest rates are low compared to long term 
rates 
35.94 1.89 1.82 1.93 1.93 1.85 16.39 1.11 0.94 1.44 0.50 1.50***  25.00 1.48 1.56 1.37 1.53 1.45 
(c) We issue short-term when we are waiting 
for long-term market interest rates to 
decline 
28.70 1.78 1.67 1.90** 1.72 1.87 11.48 0.89 0.55 1.44*** 0.38 1.22***  13.95 1.05 1.17 0.89 0.71 1.21 
(d) We borrow short-term so that returns from 
new projects can be captured more fully by 
shareholders, rather than committing to pay 
long-term profits as interest to debtholders 
9.48 0.94 1.01 0.85* 0.96 0.90 12.90 0.82 0.73 0.89 0.67 0.86  9.09 0.80** 0.88 0.68 0.71 0.83 
(e) We expect our credit rating to improve, so 
we borrow short-term until it does 
8.99 0.85 0.79 0.99* 0.98 0.65*** 5.00 0.57 0.42 0.83 0.25 0.77**  4.65 0.47 0.42 0.53 0.50 0.45 
(f) Borrowing short-term reduces the chance 
that our firm will want to take on risky 
projects 
4.02 0.53 0.56 0.49 0.55 0.51 1.72 0.45 0.31 0.59 0.33 0.55  2.33 0.40 0.29 0.53 0.36 0.41 
 
 39
 
Table 9 - continued         
Survey responses to the question "What factors affect your firm’s choice between short-and long-term debt?"     
          
   Germany  France 
          
   Leverage Target debt    Leverage Target debt 
   % always    ratio  % always    ratio 
   or almost      or almost     
   always Mean Low High No Yes always Mean Low High No Yes 
               
(b) Matching the maturity of our debt with the 
life of our assets 
60.34 2.55 2.28 2.98*** 1.89 2.86*** 31.91 1.68 1.70 1.78 1.42 2.38** 
(g) We issue long-term debt to minimize the 
risk of having to refinance in “bad times” 
51.75 2.24 1.93 2.71*** 2.03 2.33 31.91 1.68 1.59 2.13 1.31 2.47** 
(a) We issue short term when short term 
interest rates are low compared to long term 
rates 
37.39 1.93 1.90 1.98 1.79 2.00 30.19 1.58 1.47 2.10 1.61 1.53 
(c) We issue short-term when we are waiting 
for long-term market interest rates to 
decline 
37.39 1.90 1.80 2.04 1.54 2.06* 16.98 1.15 1.07 1.56 1.06 1.35 
(d) We borrow short-term so that returns from 
new projects can be captured more fully by 
shareholders, rather than committing to pay 
long-term profits as interest to debtholders 
4.42 0.54 0.56 0.51 0.73 0.45 13.21 0.83 0.70 1.40 0.64 1.24 
(e) We expect our credit rating to improve, so 
we borrow short-term until it does 
7.89 0.58 0.45 0.78 0.57 0.58 11.76 0.75 0.55 1.67 0.66 0.94 
(f) Borrowing short-term reduces the chance 
that our firm will want to take on risky 
projects 
6.31 0.59 0.42 0.86** 0.42 0.68 15.22 0.83 0.75 1.33 0.72 1.07 
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Table 10: Multivariate Probit regression output for capital structure 
 
 Flexibility Target  Tax advantage Bankruptcy costs 
 Full Sample EU  Full Sample EU  Full Sample EU  Full Sample EU 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Constant 0.03 (0,15) 
  -0,47** 
(-2,12) 
  -0.65** 
(-2,21)  
   0.67*** 
(3,57) 
0,10 
(0,46) 
0.21 
(0,81)  
 -0.32* 
(-1.73) 
  -0,95*** 
(-4,12) 
  -1,25*** 
(-3,82)  
0,13 
(0,73) 
-0,18 
(-0,85) 
-0,46 
(-1,55) 
Germany-dummy -0.07 (-0,33) 
0,07 
(0,31) 
0,12 
(0,50)  
-0.11 
(-0,52) 
0,02 
(0,07) 
-0.04 
(-0,18)  
  -0.49** 
(-2,14) 
 -0,39* 
(-1,65) 
-0,33 
(-1,32)  
  -0,46*** 
(-2,10) 
  -0,46** 
(-2,10) 
 -0,41* 
(-1,74) 
France-dummy -0.37 (-1,45) 
-0,32 
(-1,23) 
-0.30 
(-1,06)  
  -0,86*** 
(-3,46) 
  -0,78*** 
(-3,02) 
  -0.84*** 
(-3.15)  
-0.23 
(-0,90) 
-0,05 
(-0,19) 
0,12 
(0,43)  
-0,08 
(-0,31) 
0,07 
(0,27) 
0,18 
(0,62) 
U.K.-dummy -0,03 (-0,11) 
0,09 
(0,35) 
0,13 
(0,54)  
 -0,41* 
(-1,70) 
-0,31 
(-1,23) 
-0,30 
(-1,14)  
-0,20 
(-0,81) 
-0,09 
(-0,35) 
-0,11 
(-0,41)  
-0,17 
(-0,72) 
-0,12 
(-0,48) 
-0,09 
(-0,37) 
U.S.-dummy 0,21 (1,08) 
0,32 
(1,56) -  
0.21 
(1,03) 
0,29 
(1,31) -  
0.19 
(0,97) 
0,05 
(0,26) -  
-0,01 
(-0,05) 
-0,02 
(-0,11) - 
Leverage - -0,15 (-1,31) 
-0.15 
(-0,89)  - 
   0,61*** 
(4,66) 
   0.72*** 
(3,93)  - 
0,07 
(0,60) 
-0,05 
(0,28)  - 
0,05 
(0,40) 
-0,05 
(-0,30) 
Target leverage -  0,24
* 
(1,76) 
  0.33** 
(1,88)  - - -  - 
  0,41** 
(2,78) 
   0,65*** 
(3,18)  - 
   0,42*** 
(3,11) 
   0,63*** 
(3,46) 
Size - 0,10 (0,74) 
0.24 
(1,02)  - 
   0,41*** 
(2,63) 
   0.87*** 
(3,25)  - 
   0,72*** 
(5,37) 
   0,69*** 
(2,98)  - 
-0,12 
(-0,92) 
-0,11 
(-0,45) 
Dividend -    0,48
*** 
(4,04) 
   0.60*** 
(3,51)  - 
   0,46*** 
(3,74) 
   0.41** 
(2,53)  - 
0,18 
(1,43) 
-0,02 
(-0,11)  - 
0,02 
(0,15) 
-0,02 
(-0,10) 
Shareholder orientated (EU) - - -0.01 (-0,05)  - - 
-0.19 
(-1,09)  - - 
0,33 
(1,57)  - - 
0,15 
(0,79) 
          
N 632 563 303  674 616 313  639 570 280  632 562 268 
McFadden R-squared 0.02 0,05 0.09  0.06 0,15 0.14  0.03 0,11 0.11  0,01 0,03 0,06 
Akaike info criterion 1.38 1,34 1.23  1.11 1,01 1.18  1.30 1,21 1.11  1,38 1,38 1,37 
Models 1 and 2 employ a pooled data set in which our European sample is merged with the U.S. Model 3 exclusively focuses on the European sample. The dummy for flexibility has value one if 
at least one response to the question g of Table 7 exceeds 2, or zero otherwise. The dummy for target equals one if the respondents indicate that they set a target debt ratio, and zero otherwise. 
The dummy for tax advantage has value one if the response to the questions a of Table 7 exceeds 2, and zero otherwise. The dummy for bankruptcy costs equals one if at least one response to the 
question b and h of Table 7 exceeds 2, or zero otherwise. The dummies of the control variables size, MBA, and shareholder orientation are defined as in Table 1. Additional regressions are 
available on our website. The McFadden R-squared is the likelihood ratio index and is an analogue to the R-squared reported in linear regression models. The Akaike info criterion provides a 
measure of information that strikes a balance between this measure of goodness of fit and parsimonious specification of the model, the lower the value the better the fit of the model. Coefficient 
estimates marked with *, **, *** are statistically significant at a 10%, 5%, and 1% confidence level. 
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